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Objectives. The purpose of this study was to determine whether
reimbursement in direct proportion to expected therapeutic ben-
efit Is capable of improving the utilization and cost of health care .
Background. The benefit associated with a particular medical
or surgical treatment varies widely from patient to patient .
Nevertheless, payment to the provider of the treatment Is essen-
tially invariant under the current fee-for-service system . Under an
alternative fee-for-benefit strategy, empiric data are used to
construct a multivariable model to predict the expected benefit
to an individual patient from a particular health care service on
the basis of conventional clinical descriptors. The payers and the
providers of the service then openly negotiate an explicit economic
relation between expected benefit and monetary payment such
that payment is directly proportional to benefit .
That any sane nation, having observed that yon could provide
for the supply of bread by giving bakers a pecuniary interest
in bat ing for you, should go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary
interest in cutting off your leg, is enough to make one despair
of political humanity.
-G. B. SHAW (The Doctor's Dilemma, 1911)
Physicians should . . . learn to use . . . a synthesis of princi-
ples of economics, statistics, probability and decision theory
applied to the complex goals of medical decision-making .
-A. C . BNTttovEN (Siuattuck Lrciarr, I'm)
A variety of proposals are being advocated to improve the
utilization, cost and quality of health cLre services (1-9) .
None of them, however, directly targets the principal goal of
health care : the provision of therapeutic benefit . We herein
propose one such system .
Typically, the expected "therapeutic benefit" associated
with a particular medical or surgical therapy varies widely
among patients . For example, a patient with left main
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Methods. Computer simulations were performed to determine
the potential impact of this fee-for-benefit strategy with respect to
medical versus surgical treatment of coronary artery disease .
Resalls. Compared with conventional fee-for-service, fee-for-
benefit resulted in a 12% improvement in patient benefit (quality-
adjusted survival), a 22% reduction in provider payments and a
55% increase in cost/benefit (the ratio of benefit to payment) .
Conclusions. The incentives embodied In a fee-for-benefit
strategy can be an effective mechanism for encouraging more
appropriate health care utilization while simultaneously control-
ling health care costs .
(J Am Coll Corrdiol 1993,22 .343-52)
coronary artery disease, depressed left ventricular function
or intractable angina pectoris is predicted to derive more
benefit from coronary artery bypass surgery than is a patient
with single-vessel coronary artery disease, normal ventricu-
lar function or symptoms that are well controlled with
conventional medical therapy . Despite these differences in
expected benefit, however, the payment for surgical treat-
ment of these two patients is essentially invariant under the
current fee-for-service system . Thus, the current health care
system tends to encourage the provision of service rather
than the provision of benefit .
If we instead make payment proportional to expected
benefit, we immediately establish an economic incentive
to encourage the provision of benefit rather than the provi-
sion of service. Our purpose is to suggest an explicit frame-
work for such a fef-for-benefit system and to provide a
practical clinical exam pie of how that system might work . To
do this requires two steps : We need to 1) quantify the
expected benefit for a particular therapeutic service and then
2) develop a strategy that relates the payment of fees to that
benefit .
Quantificfution of Expected Benefit
To demonstrate how a typical fee-for-benefit strategy might
be used in clinical practice, we developed a model for
quantifying expected benefit with respect to the medical and
surgical treatment of coronary artery disease, similar to that
0735-1097/93156_00
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used by the American College of Cardiology/American
Heart Association Subcommittee on Coronary Artery By-
pass Graft Surgery in its development of clinical guidelines
for surgical referral (10). Although our model is based on
published data, it has not yet been prospectively validated . It
is therefore intended only to illustrate that the quantification
of benefit is feasible .
Actuarial survival is first estimated on the basis of age and
gender among patients without coronary artery disease using
conventional life tables (11) and adjusted for comorbidity by
the method of Charlson et al . (12). The survival for medically
treated patients is then estimated by modifying the actuarial
survival curve using the empiric muitipliers for conventional
clinical descriptors reported by Wong et al . (13) and the
probability of disease determined from the results of nonin-
vasive stress testing (14) . The survival for surgically 4 :eated
patients is then estimated by modifying the medical survival
curve using additional empiric multipliers reported by Wong
et al. (13). Finally, each survival curve is adjusted with
respect to the quality of life associated with angina pectoris
(downward for the presence of persistent angina under
medical therapy and upward for the relief of angina after
surgery) using the conventional time trade-off method (15)
based on data reported by Miyamoto and Eraker (16).
Further refinements of this model would allow additional
adjustments of these survival estimates with respect to
psychosocial aspects of quality of life (17).
Median life expectancy is determined from each survival
curve as the number of years to 50% survival . The utility
associated with each median life expectancy (before and
after quality-of-life adjustment for angina) is determined
using the method of Btrnoon and Wolfe (1 1) . Expected
therapeutic benefit is then defined as the marginal utility (the
utility of surgical therapy minus the utility of medical ther-
apy). By definition, whenever expected benefit is positive,
surgical therapy is preferred to medical therapy . Similarly,
whenever expected benefit is negative, medical therapy is
preferred to surgical therapy . Although a substantial number
of assumptions enter into these estimates of expected benefit
(i .e., the empiric data base and the underlying axioms
enumerated in the Appendix), each is represented explicitly
in the prediction model and is thereby open to inspection and
revision
. In no case is a therapy unequivocally characterized
as "appropriate" or "inappropriate" on the basis of implicit
subjective value judgments.
Formulation of the Relation Between
Benefit and Payment
We devised an equation representing the relation between
the benefit of coronary artery bypass surgery for an individ-
ual patient (predicted from a particular set of clinical descrip-
tors) and the monetary payment (for a particular unit of
service or an entire episode of care) to the health care
provider
. The axiomatic basis of our formulation is summa-
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rized in the Appendix . Briefly, the current fee-for-service
system is characterized by a horizontal benefit/payment
curve such that payment (the putative units of value among
payers and providers) is independent of expected benefit (the
rational unit of value among patients) . In contrast, our
fee-for-benefit system is characterized by a curve that makes
payment directly proportional to expected benefit .
Ethical considerations. What are the ethical conse-
quences of this relation? On the one hand, low payment is a
realistic disincentive for the provision of a particular thera-
peutic service . This should not, however, be viewed as
representing an unethical denial of care. Low payment
implies low expected benefit with respect to the alternative
therapy. Rather than being denied care, as might occur
under a rationing plan, or risking overtreatment, as might
occur under a fee-for-service system, the patient is more
likely to receive the most appropriate therapeutic alternative
under a fee-fcr-benefit system .
On the other hand, high payment alone can be a powerful
incentive for the provision of care . Under fee-for-benefit .
however, high payment implies high expected benefit . Con-
sequently, unscrupulous providers who attempt to "skim the
cream" by seeking out the few patients for whom payment is
highest will (even if inadvertently) wind up delivering the
most benefit. Those who question the propriety of setting the
fee for high benefit care above that of low benefit care-of
pricing medical benefit as a commodity-are basing their
judgment on the implicit assumption that medical benefit is a
social right . Would they as quickly question the pricing of
any other product in proportion to its quality?
Economic considerations. In a sense, the benefit/payment
curve is an approximation of the value of a particular
medical service in terms of its personal utility-its "demand
price," in economic parlance. But in conventional econom-
ics there is also a "supply price" associated with the
service-the value of the service in terms of its cost of
production-and others have suggested relating fee-for-
service payments to this price (3) . Although economists have
debated at some length whether it is "utility" or "cost of
production" that governs value, Marshall (18) considers the
distinction irrelevant, arguing that "we might as reasonably
dispute whether it is the upper or the under blade of a pair of
scissors that cuts a piece of paper . . . ." To paraphrase
Marshall, so long as a particular service is already available,
the price people will be willing to pay for it will be governed
by their desire to have it, together with the amount that they
can afford to spend on it . Fee-for-benefit simply calibrates
this "desire" in terms of expected therapeutic benefit .
Practical considerations. If one accepts the conceptual
basis of fee-for-benefit, and the technical feasibility of quan-
tifying expected benefit, there is still a practical problem .
How does one arrive at a benefit/payment curve when
patients, physicians, hospital providers and third-party pay-
ers each have their own implicit often conflicting-goals?
Figure 1 illustrates hypothetical benefit/payment curves rep-
resenting four such proprietary attitudes . In this particular
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Figure 1. Top, Idealized benefit/payment curves depicting the hy-
pothetical proprietary goals of a hospital provider, a third-party
payer, a patient and a physician provider: x was represents expected
benefit and y axis represents monetary payment (each
in arbitrary
units) . Bottom, Arithmetic average of the four curves (thin line) and
the best-fit sigmoid curve derived from logistic regression (bold line)
that might serve as the negotiated operative basis of a fee-for-benefit
strategy .
case, the hospital seeks reimbursement for care on a con-
ventional fee-for-service basis, without regard to its appro-
priateness (in terms of benefit), whereas the payer offers
reimbursement only for appropriate care . The patient is
similarly unwilling to pay for inappropriate care but is willing
to pay for appropriate care in direct proportion to its
expected benefit. The physician is willing to accept payment
in proportion to expected benefit but a's unwilling to acknowl-
edge an explicit threshold of appropriat+mess.
We can arrive at an operative benefit/ : payment curve by a
simple averaging of the individual proprietary curves (as in
the bottom panel of Fig . 1) or, better still,
1y open negotia-
tion among representatives for each of she parties
. As a
preliminary to this negotiation, each p;-Ac y would be well
advised to understand how changes in the benefit/payment
curve will affect its own proprietary goals. This can be
accomplished through computer simulations based on the
actual number of patients who are candidates for the proce-
dure, the actual distribution of expected benefit in the
i
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population and the actual costs and charges under the
current fee-for-service system (administrative and medical) .
01 course, some of the parties to this negotiation might
wield more authority than others, but at least each will be
represented . At present, patients and physicians have com-
paratively little say about the fee schedules establish' :d by
payers.
Computer Simulation of the
Fee-for-Benefit Strategy
We. performed a series of such computer simulations to
assess the potential effects of our fee-for-benefit strategy .
The simulations assumed that 1,000 patients with expected
benefits distributed as a beta density function transformed
over the range - I to + 1 (mean 0 .3, SD 0 .2) were being
considered for coronary artery bypass surgery . The conven-
tional fee-for-se.vice model used an arbitrary payment of
$30,000/patient for bypass surgery and a 14 profit to the
providers equivalent to a profit of $3,684 on costs of
$26,316 . The simulation software is available on request .
Selection for surgical treatment was determined by a
humanitarian incentive represented by the benefit associated
with surgical treatment and a commercial incentive repre-
sented by the payment associated with surgical treatment .
The magnitude of the commercial incentive relative to the
humanitarian incentive was adjusted by a weighting factor
ranging between 0 and 1 . In general, when the weighting
factor with respect to the commercial incentive was w, the
weighting factor with respect to the humanitarian incentive
was I - w. Thus, when w = 0 only the humanitarian
incentive was operative, thereby mimicking a pure academic
altruist, and when w = 1 only the commercial incentive was
operative, thereby mimicking a pure entrepreneurial egoist .
The minimal payment was set at $0, and the maximal
payment was arbitrarily set at $60,000 twice that under
fee-for-service .
A simulation was then conducted with the weighting
factor set at w = 0 the altruistic model , and the percent
change in each of six outcome measures was computed
relative to conventional fee-for-service: caseload, average
benefit, average payment per case, total payments, average
profit, average cost-benefit the ratio of average benefit to
average payment per case . The maximal payment was then
adjusted in increments of $1,000 until the altruistic model
was essentially neutral with respect to these outcomes. This
occurred at a maximal payment of $86,000 . The simulations
were then repeated using this new maximal payment at
weighting factors of w = 0.25, w = 0
.5, w = 0.75 and w = I .
Representative simulations are illustrated graphically in Fig-
ure 2
. As the magnitude of the commercial incentive was
increased in proportion to the humanitarian incentive, the
number of patients referred for bypass surgery decreased,
and the distribution of benefit among these referrals was
shifted upward
. The percent change in the six outcome
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Figure 2. Representative simulation studies of the fee-for-benefit
strategy . Top panel, Distribution of expected benefit among 1,000
hypothetical candidates for coronary artery bypass surgery bars
represent the raw distribution generated by random sampling, carve
is a beta density function fitted to that distribution . Second panel,
Distribution of expected benefit among 637 randomly selected
surgical "referrals" using a minimal weighting factor of 0 humani-
tarian incentive alone . Third panel, 482 "referrals" at a weighting
factor of 0.5 equivalent humanitarian and commercial incentives .
Fourth panel, 235 "referrals" at a maximal weighting factor of I
commercial incentive alone . Bottom panel, Curve used to deter-
mine monetary payment as a function of expected benefit in each
simulation . See text for discussion .
measures relative to fee-for-service is summarized in Table I
for each of the simulations .
On the basis of these simulations, each of the four
interested parties the patient, the physician, the hospital
and the insurer stands to gain with respect to its proprietary
goals under the fee-for-benefit strategy compared with the
fee-for-service strategy . For example, when the commercial
incentive is equal to the humanitarian incentive Fig. 3 ,
patients obtain a 5
increase in benefit, physicians receive a
6 increase in the average fee per unit of service, the
hospital earns a 32 increase in its profit margin as a result
of a 24
reduction in caseload and the attendant costs and
the insurer gains by a 20
reduction in the total fees paid .
Society, too, gains; cost-benefit increases by 31 as a result
of the increase in benefit and the reduction in cost .
Of course, these outcomes are highly dependent on the
Table 1 . Improved Outcome Under Fee-for-Benefit : Sensitivity to
the Ratio Between Commercial and Humanitarian Incentives*
"The commercial incentive is quantified in terms of dollars, and the humn-
ilanan incentive is quantified in teens of marginal utility. Tabulated outcomes
represent percent improvements under fee-for-benefit relative to fee-for-service .
Average patient benefit improved by 12 , total provider payments decreased by
22 and average cost-benefit increased by 55 across all five of these incentive
ratios.
actual distribution of expected benefit within the target
population and the particular parameters of the negotiated
benefit/payment curve. Formal sensitivity analyses with
respect to all of these factors were not performed because
our intent was to show only that a fee-for-benefit strategy
has the potential to improve health care outcome . The actual
improvements can be determined only by an empiric trial .
Prospective Clinical Application of the
Fee-for-Benefit Strategy
Once a negotiated benefit/payment function is agreed on
by the payers and the providers, it could be used to influence
prospective decision making . The following hypothetical
case example illustrate, this use .
Figure 3. Percent change in each of six outcome measures with
respect to fee-for-service for the fee-for-benefit simulation in which
the humanitarian incentive and commercial incentives are equiva-
lent a weighting factor of 0.5 . CASES = surgical case load ;
COST = total provider payments : BENEFIT = average expected
benefit ; FEE = average payment per case; CB = average cost-
benefit; PROFIT = average provider profit . Results for other
weighting factors are shown in Table 1 .
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CASES COST BENEFIT
FEE C/B PROFIT
Commercial/Humanitarian Incentive Ratio
0:1 1 :3 1 :1 3 :1 1 :0
Surgical case load 0 -11.9 -24 .3 -39.1 -63 .1
Total provider payments -0.2 -10.2 --20 .2 -31 .4 -46.7
Average patient benefit 0 1 .6 4 .7 11 .2 43 .4
Average payment per
case
-0.2 2 .0 5 .5 12.6 44 .5
Average cost-benefit 0.2 13 .2 31 .3 62.1
168 .9
Average provider profit -1 .2 11 .8 31 .6 68.7 189 .3
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Figure 4. Survival curves for a hypothetical patient with coronary
artery disease . For each curve, median life expectancy is defined by
the number of years on the y axis associated with 50 survival
horizontal line on the x axis . Top, Actuarial survival for a healthy
60-year old man upper curve and patient s survival under medical
lower curve and surgical middle curve therapy . Expected benefit
from surgery is approximately equal to the difference in mediate
survival 6.3 - 5.3 years divided by median actuarial survival 15 .8
years . Bottom, The same three therapeutic states after quality
adjustment . The medical curve is shifted down with the axes of the
graph serving as the lower bound , and the surglral curve is shifted
up, with the actuarial curve serving as the upper bound . Here,
expected benefit from surgery is approximately equal to the differ-
ence in quality-adjusted survival 9.8 - 2.0 years divided by the
actuarial survival 15.8 years .
Case report. A 60-year old man with no history of myo-
cardial infarction or heart failure complains of chronic stable
angina pectoris . He undergoes treadmill exercise testing
using the Bruce protocol, exercising for 7 min to a heart rate
of 150 beatstmin and a systolic blood pressure of 190 mm Hg .
His usual anginal symptoms develop 5 min into exercise at a
heart rate of 120 beatsimin, and 2-mm horizontal ST segment
depression occurs in recovery . Coronary angiography re-
veals a 75 narrowing of the proximal anterior descending
coronary artery and a 90 narrowing of the circumflex
marginal coronary artery . The patient s symptoms are
readily controlled by the administration of a beta-,adrenergic
blocking agent .
DIAMOND ET At
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Life expectancy. These data are consistent with a pre-
dicted median life expectancy of 5
.3 years under medical
therapy compared with an actuarial life expectancy of 15 .8
years Fig. 4A . Median life expectancy is predicted to
increase to 6.3 years with coronary artery bypass surgery .
As defined in the Appendix, the utility associated with
medical therapy is 0.59 versus 0.67 for surgery 11 . Because
this patient
s symptoms are adequately controlled with med-
ical therapy, the relatively small incremental benefit of 0 .08
0.67 - 0.59 associated with the 1-year 6.3 - 5.3 gain in
survival resulting from surgical therapy leads to a projected
payment of only $6,264 .
Quality-adjusted life expectancy . If the patient continued
to have angina on medical therapy, however, the estimate of
surgical benefit must be adjusted for quality of life
. Accord-
ingly, median quality-adjusted life expL ctancy with medical
therapy decreases to 2 .0 years as a result of the re iuced
quality of life associated with refractory angina, wnereas
median quality-adjusted life expectancy increases to 9.8
years with surgical therapy as a result of the projected
syntplornatic relies Fig. 4B . The utility associated with
medical therapy is now only 0.29 versus 0.87 with surgery
11 . The higher incremental benefit of 0 .58 0.87 - 0.29
associated with the 7.8-year 9 .8 - 2.0 gain in quality-
adjusted survival resulting from surgical therapy leads to a
higher projected payment of $54,214.
In this hypothetical patient with double-vessel coronary
artery disease and normal left ventricular function whose
symptoms are adequately controlled with medical therapy,
the benefit/payment function provides a powerful disincen-
tive to the relatively inappropriate performance of bypass
surgery solely for prolongation of life . When the symptoms
are not controlled with medical therapy, however, the same
benefit/payment function provides an equally powerful in-
centive for the relatively more appropriate performance of
bypass surgery to improve the quality of life .
Age. Society maintains two contradictory notions about
the valuation of human life . The criminal courts operate
under a notion of equivalence among the life spans of people .
A criminal court imposes the same prison term for the
murder of a poor cold woman as for the murder of a rich
young man. In contrast, the civil courts recognize the
nonequivalence of lives . A civil court awards higher punitive
damages for the negligent death of a rich young man than for
the negligent death of a poor old woman. We assume that
physicians practice medicine under the notion of equiva-
lence without any particular age or gender bias . but the
presentation is readily modified to account for any such
nonequivalence i9 .
Table 2 summarizes the influence of patient age on
expected therapeutic benefit and reimbursement under this
fee-for-benefit strategy . Because we have chosen to define
expected benefit by a utility function explicitly designed to
be unbiased with respect to age, reimbursement actually
increases in older patients because they manifest a greater
proportional improvement in life expectancy. This charac-
348
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Table 2. Influence of Age on Outcome and Reimbursement Under Fee-for-Benefit
Life expectancy is in years marginal life expectancy is the arithmetic difference in medical and surgical life
expectancy ; Utility is in units proportional to median actuarial life expectancy
; marginal utility or expected benefit
is the arithmetic difference in medical and surgical utility approximately equal to marginal life expectancy divided
by actuarial life expectancy ; reimbursement is in 1990 dollars .
teristic at least partially offsets the expected increase in costs
resulting from the greater degree of comorbidity among such
patients .
Gender. Table 3 compares the outcome and reimburse-
ment for a 60-year old woman with clinical findings identical
to those of our 60-year old man . According to these data,
Table 3. Influence of Gender on Outcome and Reimbursement
Under Fee-fin-Benefit
JACC Vol . 22, No
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although women tend to live longer than men, they manifest
similar proportional changes in life expectancy in response
to treatment. As a result, there is very little difference in
reimbursement for coronary artery bypass surgery among
men and women with similar clinical presentations. Fee-for-
benefit is myopic, if not totally blind, with respect to gender .
Advantages of Fee-for-Benefit
Empiric foundation. Our fee-for-benefit strategy de-
pends on the development and dissemination of properly
validated empiric clinical prediction models 20,21 to
help the physician predict therapeutic benefit for indi-
vidual patients. The empirical foundation of our strategy
places it in sharp contrast to alternatives such as the
Health Care Financing Administration s system based on
Diagnosis Related Groups DRG or the Oregon rationing
plan rejected by former Health and Human Services Secre-
tary Louis W . Sullivan 22 . Strategies such as DRG can
punish health care providers for making good decisions by
offering low payment for appropriate treatment, for exam-
ple or reward them for making bad decisions by offering
relatively high payment for inappropriate treatment . In
contrast, our incentive function is based on expected benefit
rather than actual benefit because even a bad decision can
result in a good outcome, and a good decision sometimes
results in a bad outcome . In contrast to the laws set forth in
Hammurabi s code, the physician cannot be held responsible
for the actual outcome but only for the quality of the
decisions that lead to that outcome . Unlike the Oregon plan,
Age
40 Years 60 Years 80 Years
Life expectancy
Median actuarial life expectancy 33 .1 15 .8 4 .9
Median life expectancy with surgical treatment 14 .8
6.3 2 .3
Median life expectancy with medical treatment 14.7 5 .3 1 .3
Marginal life expectancy 0 .1 1 .0 1 .0
Utility of surgical treatment 0 .723 0.667 0.753
Utility of medical treatment
0 .720
0
.591 0.487
Marginal utility
0,003
0 .076
0.266
Reimbursement for surgical treatment $4,142 $6,264 $17,077
Quality-adjusted life expectancy
Median quality-adjusted actuarial fife expectancy 33 .1 15.8 4.9
Median quality-adjusted life expectancy with surgical treatment 17 .9 9.8
4 .3
Median quality-adjusted life expectancy with medical treatment
10 .1
2.0
0 .1
Marginal quality-adjusted life expectancy 7 .8 7.8 4 .2
Quality-adjusted utility or surgical treatment 0.815 0.874 0 .990
Quality-adjusted utility of medical treatment
0.555 0.285 0 .073
Marginal quality-agjusted utility
0.260 0.589 0.917
Reimbursement for surgical treatment $16,441
$54,214 $79,507
Man Woman
Life expectancy
Median actuarial life expectancy
15
.8 21 .9
Median life expectancy with surgical treatment
6.3 7
.9
Median iF_ expectancy with medical treatment
5.3 7.2
Marginal Fe expectancy
1 .0 0.7
Utility of surgical treatment
0.667 0.628
Utility of medical treatment
0.591 0.585
Marginal utility
0.076
0.043
Reimbursement for surgical treatment
$6,264
$5,185
Quality-adjusted life expectancy
Median quality-adjusted actuarial life expectancy
15 .8 21 .9
Median quality-a.
.,Isted fife expectancy with
9.8 13.0
surgical treatment
Median quality-adjusted life expectancy with
2.0 2.6
medical treatment
Marginal quality-adjusted life expectancy
7.8 10.4
Quality-adjusted utility of surgical treatment
0.874 0.857
Quality-adjusted utility or medical treatment
0.2115
0.270
Marginal quality-adjusted utility
0.599
0.587
Reimbursement for surgical treatment
$54,214
$53,983
See Table 2 for explanation of terms
.
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which Sullivan said violates th.e Americans with Disabilities
Act because it is based on the premise that "the value of the
life of a person with a disability is less than the value of a life
of a person without a disability" 22 , fee-for-benefit is based
on quality-of-life valuations that are specifically adjusted
with respect to comorbid disabilities 12 .
Appropriateness . The incentives underlying fee-for-
benefit can be a powerful mechanism for encouraging more
appropriate utilization 23 while simultaneously controlling
costs and mitigating the widespread inequities resulting from
cost shifting 24 and practice variation 25 . Under the
current fee-for-service system, the appropriateness of utili-
zation is most often defined by an arbitrary ad hoc consensus
26-28 . The RAND-UCLA Health Services Utilization
Study 29 , for example, thereby identified no fewer than 488
"indications" for appropriate performance of coronary ar-
tery bypass surgery . One major advantage of the fee-for-
benefit strategy is that it circumvents the need of payers and
physicians to make such highly subjective categorical value
judgments with regard to appropriateness . Instead, thera-
peutic benefit is explicitly defined in terms of the most
natural of clinical outcomes : improved survival and quality
of life . Quality-of-life assessments are, of course, subjective
and sometimes as with the issue of abortion intensely
political-hut who better to make such value-laden judg-
ments than the patients themselves 30,31 ?
Outcomes assessment. The current national emphasis on
management of care by analysis of outcomes is an important
complement to our strategy . Outcomes data bases are a
valuable means of assessing the quality of care, but they
cannot by themselves improve the quality or control the cost
of that care because they do not provide any direct incen-
tives for doing so . Our fee-for-benefit strategy does . The role
of the outcomes data base is to document that the predicted
benefits are actually achieved on average . If they are not,
then the payments must be adjusted accordingly, and more
accurate prediction models developed. Moreover, individual
providers might be further rewarded or punished through
some revised reimbursement schedule if the observed im-
provement in outcome under their care is better or worse
than that predicted by the model presumably because the
quality of care rendered by these providers differs from that
of the putative standard provider . These additional adjust-
ments would provide an incentive to optimize actual benefit
as well as expected benefit 3 .
Medicolegal liability . According tc Weistart 32 , the le-
gal test for medical liability is entirely dependent on the
medical profession s standard of reasonable care and not on
an externally imposed norm . From this perspective, the use
of prediction models to estimate benefit might thereby re-
duce the physician s exposure to legal liability by helping tc
codify and disseminate such standards . However, Miller et
al . 33 note that a physician who relies on the "advice" of
such prediction models could be held as negligent as one
who relies on the advice of a human consultant, if it is judged
that he should have known that the advice was substandard .
DIAMOND ET AL.
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But they wa"n also of an equal potential for liability if the
physician is judged to have failed to exercise reasonable care
by not having "consulted" the model
. Consequently. phy-
sicians might better defend their therapeestic decisions by
basing them on an agreed-on, formal prediction of benefit .
This practice could reduce malpractice liability and the
associated costs of unnecessary defensive medical care .
Cooperation. Axelrod 34 has described four character-
istics that serve to encourage the evolution of cooperation
among parties with competing interests, such as payers and
providers. The fee-for-benefit strategy possesses each of
these salutary characteristics . First, the strategy is fair ; it is
based on economic incentives that have immediate intuitive
appeal because they make the individual patient s benefit the
central focus. Second, the strategy is provokable ; it swiftly
"punishes" each instance of poor medical care one with
relatively low expected benefit by an immediate reduction
in payment. Third, the strategy isforgiving ; it just as swiftly
"rewards" each instance of good medical care one with
relatively high expected benefit by an immediate increase in
payment, no matter how many times it has imposed punish-
ment for poor medical care in the past . Fourth, the strategy
is explicit ; its rules for reward and punishment are precisely
defined .
Limitations of Fee-for-Benefit
Unreliable data . Several practical problems are associ-
ated with the fee-for-benefit strategy . Expected benefit must
be predicted from a sufficient set of relevant clinical descrip-
tors that are available to the physician at the time of the
decision. Unfortunately, although a reasonably reliable data
base currently exists with respect to survival after medical
and surgical treatment of coronary artery disease, this is not
so with respect to quality of life or for many other important
diseases and their therapies . Moreover, we know of no
studies attempting to quantify the degree to which physi-
cians are motivated by humanitarian versus commercial
incentives .
Fortunately, our fee-for-benefit strategy does not require
the accurate prediction of benefit . The only requirement is
that patients be accurately ranked in order of increasing
benefit . Consequently, the discrimination of the putative
prediction model the ability to correctly identify the patient
with the greater expected benefit is more important than its
calibration the ability to accurately quantify the benefit for
a given patient 35 . Although the prediction model used in
this study has not been prospectively validated, it neverthe-
less illustrates the feasibility of deriving the requisite esti-
mates of benefit from empirical data bases if we are willing to
make some reasonable explicit assumptions .
Potential for fraud
. If only objective measures such as
left ventricular ejection fraction and the number of diseased
coronary arteries are used in the estimation of benefit, we
cannot consider important aspects of quality of life
. But if
subjective measures
such as the severity of angina are
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included, then the physician and the patient have an incen-
tive to misrepresent the data in return for higher payment
and more care. Of course, the current fee-for-service system
already encourages this type of misrepresentation . How
often are patients with chronic stable angina pectoris admit-
ted through the emergency room with a diagnosis of "unsta-
ble angina" to ensure insurance coverage of the hospital
stay? Nevertheless, our fee-for-benefit proposal is particu-
larly vulnerable to such abuses, and effective measures will
be required to prevent them 36,37 .
Access. Few without health insurance can afford health
care
. Yet, 35 million citizens are currently without such
insurance and are thereby denied access to health care 1 .
This problem is not directly addressed by our proposal . For
those who already have access to health care, benefit is
improved at lower cost, but a separate plan is needed to
provide access to those without insurance . Fortunately, the
fee-for-benefit strategy can be integrated with any such plan
24 , whether it be some form of universal health insurance,
including the "play or pay" plan promoted by congressional
Democrats, the "managed competition" plan advocated by
the new Democratic administration or the federal vouchers
and income tax incentives proposed by the former Republi-
can administration. Regardless of the particular system of
health care, the fee-for-benefit strategy offers a singular
opportunity to provide more quality care at less cost . For
instance, it has been estimated that as many as 30 of
coronary artery bypass procedures 29 and 90 of coronary
angiograms 25 are "unnecessary ." If so, the predicted
reduction in caseload resulting from implementation of the
fee-for-benefit strategy is entirely justified, and the money
saved through these reductions-something of a health div-
idend-could go a long way toward helping to pay for a
federal plan to improve access to care although there is no
assurance that the dividend would actually be paid .
Choice. Some patients and physicians might demand the
right to choose a particular form of therapy, even though the
expected benefit is low . After all, prediction models cannot
be perfectly accurate because they can never include all of
the information relevant to every individual situation . One
possible solution to this limitation of fee-for-benefit is private
coinsurance, bought by individuals who want to protect their
access in contrast to their right to low benefit care. The
situation is analogous to that for cosmetic surgery . Conven-
tional medical insurance does not pay for such service .
Those who want it must pay for it themselves, rather than
putting the burden on the rest of society .
Restricted applicability . Finally, not all care can be paid
this way. Perhaps only the few therapies most taxing to the
health care system such as bone marrow transplantation
because of its high cost or transurethal prostatectomy be-
cause of its high volume should be so managed . The
additional care associated with these therapies chest X-ray
films and follow-up visits, for example
could be bundled
into a single package encompassing an entire episode of care
over an extended period of time. Several of the Patient
JACC Vol. 22, No
. 2
August 1993
:343-52
Outcomes Research Team projects being funded through the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research 38 could
serve as a reasonable starting point .
Just as the randomized clinical trial is the current scien-
tific exemplar of medical practice although relatively few
therapies are ever subjected to its rigor , fee-for-benefit is
the economic exemplar-a rational conceptual foundation
for health care reform on which the bioethicists, economists
and decision analysts together might erect an enduring
practical structure 39 . The federal government could en-
courage this construction by providing sufficient financial
support for the conduct of the requisite empiric studies
directed at quantifying the actual benefits associated with a
variety of important health care targets for example, partic-
ular diseases, tests or treatments .
Summary. We have outlined what we believe to be the
framework for an economic strategy that promises to in-
crease quality of care widle reducing health care costs . The
strategy evolves over four distinct stages, encompassing the
"synthesis of economics, statistics, probability and decision
theory" espoused by Enthoven in the epigram : 1 empiric
data are used to construct a formal model to predict the
expected benefit to an individual patient from the provision
of a particular health care service ; 2 the payers and the
providers of the service negotiate an explicit economic
relation between expected benefit and payment on the basis
of outcome projections derived from computer simulations
using their own empiric data or their best estimates of such
data ; 3 the prospective performance of the prediction
model is monitored by comparing these outcome projections
with the actual outcomes, and 4 the empiric prediction
model and the negotiated payment function are revised
appropriately in light of these comparisons .
Ours is not an omnibus proposal for health care re-
form such as those advocated by recent presidential
candidates 6,7 and orthodox health care planners
2,8,40,41 . It does not directly satisfy conventional de-
siderata 9,42 with regard to wide-scale applicability, uni-
versal access, choice of provider, cost containment or
malpractice reform. These are indeed worthy goals, but from
our perspective they are simply subordinate to the provision
of medical benefit .
The authors appreciate the constructive comments of James S . Forrester,
MD, Kenneth Shine, MD, Harold Lull, PhD and William Go, MD on earlier
drafts of this report .
Appendix
The following axioms serve to formalize one particular system of
reimbursement for the provision of medical care in direct proportion
to expected therapeutic benefit.
Axiom 1 . A utility function U t defined over a finite period of
time t equal
to the median
life ex. ectancy T is a continuous bounded function U 0
s
U t U T , where 0 s t
:5 T and 0 s Ut
<_ 1,
that is monotonically
increasing for increasing t, where U t2 > U t, whenever ti > t, .
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It is assumed that average survival is a sufficient statistic for decision making
.
Thus, if one treatment results in 100
mortality at exactly 5 years, and another
treatment results in 10 mortality each year over 10 years, the two are equivalent
because the average survivals are equivalent . According to Axiom 1, increased
survival at a given level of disability is equivalent to increased utility. At some
level of disability, however, some patients might prefer death to further prolon-
gation of fife
; subsequent axioms deal with this contingency .
Axiom 2. Given a continuous bounded and monotonically increasing
utility function
Q t ,
then
dU t
	
dVY~
Ql
1,
> 71 [2
where
t
2
>
t, .
If a person has a median life expectancy T of 10 years, then the present
utility for the next year is larger than the present utility for the ninth year . The
difference the marginal utility gets smaller as additional years approach the
limit T. According to Axiom 2, the next year of life is worth more to us than
the succeeding year.
Axiom 3
. Given
a fixed interval of
life r, and two median life expectancies
T, < Ti , then U t,, T, > U t,, T2 .
The utility of a year of life decreases for increasing life expectancy . Thus .
the utility of l year for a person whose life expectancy I is 2 years is larger
than for a person whose life expectancy T is 10 years . This ensures there will
be no bias against the elderly . Axiom 3 poses no ethical dilemma with respect
to adult diseases such as coronary artery disease, but it might not be
applicable to diseases such as acute leukemia that occur in both the very
young and the very old 43 .
Axiom 4. Given two
different
treatments Rx, and Rs2
associated with
different median life expectancies T, and T2 , the benefit associated with Rx2
is equivalent to the marginal utility
BR,
= UR, 2 T2 - UR ,, T, .
According to Axiom 4, benefit ranges from - I to I ; benefit is positive
when the life expectancy associated with the second treatment is less than that
associated with the first treatment ; benefit is 0 when the two treatments are
associated with the same life expectancy ; and benefit is negative when the life
expectancy associated with the second treatment is greater than that of the
first treatment .
Axiom S. Given a life expectancy t, the quality-adjusted life expectancy q
is monotonically decreasing over the domain 0 C q C t .
Axiom 5 states that the quality-adjusted period of life expectancy for a
given disease is always less than or equal to the unadjusted period of fife
expectancy for the disease as a result of the disability caused by the associated
symptoms .
Axiom 6. Given a treatment resulting in an
improvement in life expectancy
t, > t„ the quality-adjusted lif : expectancy associated with the treatment q2
is monotonically increasing over the domain r2
s
q2 s T.
Axiom 6 states that the quality-adjusted period of life expectancy for a
beneficial treatment is always greater than or equal to the unadjusted period of
life expectancy because a treatment that improves life expectancy also
improves disability
. Axiom 6 can be violated for some particular diseases and
treatments. Surgical amputation of an extremity for treatment of malignancy,
for example, might increase life expectancy and simultaneously decrease
quality-adjusted life expectancy .
Axiom 7. A paymentfunction P B , defined over a finite domain of benefit
-1 s B
:s 1, Is a continuous, nonnegative function 0 !5 P -1
S
P
B
S
P
1
that is monotonically increasing for increasing B, P
B2 > P B, , whenever
B2 > B, .
In
contrast to the current fee-for-service system . Axiom 7 provides a
greater payment for greater benefit, ensuring that payment is never negative
as might be the case for Hammurabi s code . In this study, a logistic equation
was used to represent the putative relation between the expected benefit to an
individual patient undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery predicted from
a particular set of clinical descriptors and the monetary payment
for a
particular unit of service or an entire episode of care to the health care
provider:
Payment = P,, P
. -
P~,i„ l{l exp[-
a . Benefit b ]}
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Two parameters a . b fix the shape of the curve
linear, exponential,
sigmoid , and the other two
P,,,,, P,,,,,, limit the minimal and mavir
:;a
payments
. Any other equation meeting the constraints of Axiom 7 would
serve equally well .
References
I . Enthoven AC, Kronick R
. Universal health insurance through incentives
reform . JAMA 1991
;265 :2532-6.
2. Enthoven
A, Kronick R. A consumer-choice health plan for the 1990s :
universal health insurance in a system designed to promote quality and
economy. N EngI J Med 1989;320:29-37 .
3 . Blumenthal D, Epstein AM
. Physician-payment reform-unfinished busi-
ness. N Engl I Med 1992
;326:1330-4
.
4. McMahon JA
. The health care system in the year 2000 : three scenarios .
Acad Med 1992 ;67 :1-7 .
5, Iglehart JK. The American health care system, introduction
. N Eng J
Med 1992 ;326
:962--7
.
6
. Sullivan LB . The Bush administration s health care ;clan . N Eng I Med
1992 ;327 :801-4.
7 . Clinton B
. The Clinton health care plan . N Engl I Med 1992 ;327:804-7.
8. Himmelstein DU
. Woolhandler S . A national health program for
the United States . A physician s proposal. N Engl I Med 1989 :320 :
102-8.
9. Lundberg CD . National health care reform
: the aura of inevitability
intensifies . JAMA 1992.267 :2521-4.
10. Fisch C . Beller GA, DeSanctis RW, et al. ACGAHA guidelines and
indications for coronary artery bypass graft surgery . A report of the
American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force
on Assessment of Diagnostic and Therapeutic Cardiovascular Procedures
Subcommittee on Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery . Circulation
1991 ;83 :1125-73 .
I1 . S ; rnoon S, Wolfe H . Measuring the Effectiveness of Medical Decisions .
An Operations Research Approach . Springfield, IL : Charles C . Thomas,
1972:74-169 .
I . Charlson 4E, Pompie P, Ales KL. MacKenzie CR . A new method of
classifying prognostic comorbidity in longitudinal studies : development
end validation . I Chronic Dis 1987;40:373-83 .
13. Wong JB. Sonnenberg FA, Salem DN . Pauker SG . Diagnosis and
treatment: myocardial revascularization for chronic stable angina . Anal-
ysis
o£
the role of percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty based
on da
.
.a available in 1989. Ann Intern Med 1990:113 :852-71 .
14. Diarrond GA. Staniloff HM . Forrester IS
. Pollock BH . Swan HJC .
Computer-assisted diagnosis in the noninvasive evaluation of patients
with suspected coronary artery disease . J Am Call Cardiol 1983 :1 :
444-5 .
15 . Pliskin IS, Stason WB, Weinstein MC, et al
. Coronary artery bypass graft
surgery : clinical decision making and cost-effectiveness analysis
. Med
Decis Making 1981 ;1 :10-28 .
16 . Mivamoto JM, Eraker SA
. Parameter estimates for a QALY utility
model Med Decis Making 1985 ;5
:191-213 .
17. Kaplau RM. Health-related quality of
life in cardiovascular disease .
J Consult Clin Psychol 1988:56:382-92.
18 . Marshall A
. Principles of Economics. 9th ed. London: MacMillan.
1961 :348 .
19. Landefeld JS
. Seskin EP . The economic value of fife
: linking theory and
practice . Am J Public Health 1982
:72 :555-66.
20 . Guppy KH, Detrano R, Abbassi N
. Janosi A, Sandhu S, Froelicher V
.
The reliability of probability analysis in the prediction of coronary artery
disease in two hospitals . Med Decis Making 1989
:9:181-9.
21. Morise AP, Duval RD
. Comparison of three Bayesian methods to
estimate posttest probability in patients undergoing exercise stress test-
ing
. Am J Cardiol 1989 :64 :1117-22 .
22 . Pear R
. Plan to ration health care is rejected by government
. The New
York Times, 1992 Aug 6
:A6 .
23
. Hogarth RM . Gibbs BJ, McKenzie CRM
. Marquis MA . Learning from
feedback
: exactingness and incentives
. J Exp Psychol [Learn Mem Cogn
1991 ;17:734-52 .
24
. Coddington DC, Keen DJ, Moore KD
. Clarke RL, The Crisis in Health
Care : Costs, Choices . and Strategies
. San Francisco : Jossey-Bass
. 1991 :
103-13 .141-156 .
352
	
DIAMOND ET AL
.
FEE-FOR-BENEFIT
25
. Graboys TB, Biegelson B, Lambert S, Blatt C, Lown B . Results of a
second-opinion trial among patients recommended for coronary angiog-
raphy. JAMA 1992;268:2537-40.
26. Hilborne LH, Leape LL, Kahan JP, et al
. Percutaneous Transluminal
Coronary Angioplasty : A Literature Review and Ratings of Appropriate-
ness and Necesstt . Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation,
1991
; RAND publication JRA-0l .
27
. Leape LL, Hilborne LH, Kahan JP, et al . Coronary Artery Bypass Graft:
A Literature Review and Ratings of Appropriateness and Necessity
.
Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1991
; RAND publi-
cation JRA-02.
28. Bernstein S, Laourl M, Hilbome LH, et al . Coronary Angiography: A
Literature Review and Ratings of Appropriateness and necessity . Santa
Monica, California: The RAND Corporation . 1991 ; RAND publication
JRA-03.
29. Winslow CM, Kosecoff JB, Chassin M, Kanouse DE, Brook RH. The
appropriateness of performing coronary artery bypass surgery. JAMA
1988
;260:505-9.
30
. Sprangers MAO, Aaronson NK
. The role of health care providers and
significant others in evaluating the quality of life of patients with chronic
disease: a review . J Clin Epidemiol 1992 ;45:743-60 .
31 . Eddy DM . Connecting value and costs . Whom do we ask, and what do we
ask them? JAMA 1990 ;264:1737-9.
32 . Weistart JC
. Legal consequences of standard setting for competitive athletes
with cardiovascular abnormalities . I Am Cog Cardiol 1985 ;6:1191-7 .
JACC Vol . 22, No. 2
August 1993 :343-52
33 . Miller RA, Schaffner KF, Meisel A
. Ethical and legal issues related to the
use of computer programs in clinical medicine
. Ann Intern Med 1985 ; 102 :
529-36.
34. Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York
: Basic Books, 1994 .
35. Diamond GA
. What price perfection? Calibration and discrimination of
clinical prediction models
. J Clin Epidemiol 1992,45:85-9.
36. Diamond GA, Rozanski A, Steuer M
. Playing doctor : application of game
theory to medical decision-making
. J Chronic Dis 1986 ;39:669-77.
37. Diamond GA. Bird brains
. The evolution of scientific misconduct. Am J
Cardiol 1990;66 :372-4 .
38. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
. Report to Congress :
Progress of Research on Outcomes of Health Care Services and Proce-
dures . Rockville, Maryland
: US Department of Health and Human
Services, May 1991 ; AHCPR publication no . 91 .0004 .
39. Anonymous. Half right on health
. Blend the Bush and Clinton plans
editorial . The New York Times, 1992 Aug 31 :A12.
40. Eddy DM . Rationing by patient choice
. JAMA 1991 ;265 :105-8.
41 . Stevens CM. Health care cost containment : some implications of global
budgets
. Science 1993
;259:16-17, 105 .
42 . Angell M . The presidential candidates and health care reform . N Engl J
Med 1992327
:800-1
.
43 . Callahan D . Reforming the health care system for children and the elderly
to balance cure and care. Acad Med 1992;67 :219-22 .
